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 The field of decision making has largely focused on the influence of contextual factors 
on risk tolerance. Much work has focused on how the problem itself is presented, in hopes of 
understanding the circumstances under which individuals may be helped in areas of long-term 
investment and planning through encouragement of greater risk tolerance. Specifically, when 
making financial decisions, it has been suggested that by presenting individual decisions in 
groups (Gneezy & Potters, 1997), or by presenting feedback less frequently (Thaler et al, 
1997), participants are able to process individual problems in a holistic manner, which 
encourages risk tolerance when deciding. This literature has typically made claims that these 
effects are dependent on how the problem is presented. However, evidence for the benefits of 
“broadly bracketed” problems often relies as much on the presentation of aggregated outcomes 
as it relies on the grouping of problems. The purpose of this thesis was to further examine 
whether bracketing effects might be attributable to manipulations of problem framing or 
outcome framing.  
 In addition, it has been suggested that perhaps individuals who differ in processing 
styles might respond differentially to framing effects in general (Frederick, 2005). That is, 
perhaps individuals who are more intuitive decision makers might be more susceptible to 
context-based changes, and so might show larger framing effects. Deliberative decision 
makers, on the other hand, might overcome these framing effects by reflecting on, or actively 
“reframing”, the problem. A secondary purpose of this thesis was thus to investigate individual 
differences in the magnitude of the bracketing effect on risk tolerance. 
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 In Experiment 1, problem and outcome bracketing were examined in the domain of 
discrete choices, while in Experiment 2, bracketing was examined with continuous 
investments. Results suggest that when investment opportunities are identical, problem framing 
encourages long-term risk tolerance. However, when choices are somewhat different from one 
another, as is often the case in real-world investment situations, outcome information is critical 
to encouraging long-term risk tolerance. Together, results suggest a critical reevaluation of the 
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What makes for a “good” decision maker? Some might argue that good decision 
makers are able to make functional or rational choices in stressful situations—while deciding 
under time pressure, while performing a concurrent unrelated task, or while under emotional 
stress, they are able to accurately decide which options confer the most benefit given a 
preference set. Thus, being able to rely on intuitive or gut responses, or what “feels right”, 
might be qualities of individuals with decision making expertise. Others, however, might 
challenge this idea, instead arguing that good decisions come about through thoughtful 
deliberation on the problem. Good decision makers, for example, might be individuals who 
behave rationally and in accordance with their preferences at all times. The best decisions 
instead might be made through ignoring gut instincts, and relying instead on less obvious 
elements of the problem (such as a calculation of expected value and personal preference), 
which requires more cognitive energy.  
Perhaps the best decisions employ both the initial “gut” reaction, along with a more 
computational or controlled filter. Sloman (1996) elegantly summarized evidence for such a 
model in literature as far back as James (1890/1950), giving empirical support for such a dual-
systems account for reasoning: one that is heuristic-based, and one that is rule-based. Sloman 
describes the former associative system as one that processes information based on heuristics 
(see also Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). That is, associative processing is characterized 
by a reliance on perceptual features, operating in a generalized and automatic fashion. Sloman 
also identifies a rule-based, deliberative processing system that relies on computational 
principles, and which is systematic in function (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This second 
processing system is characterized by concrete operations, producing a response that makes 
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logical or causal sense given the alternatives and the problem itself. Critically, these two 
systems work together to resolve conflict and aid decision making at different levels, based on 
the difficulty of the task, and on the circumstances under which decision making is conducted. 
For example, individuals often act on impulse when costs are low (e.g. buying a brand of 
cereal based on its advertising campaign or position on the store shelf, rather than because it 
dominates other competitor cereals in taste or nutritional value), suggesting that an associative 
system may guide the majority of low-stakes decision making. However, a rule-based system 
may more often be employed to justify more costly choices when risks of relying on intuitive 
decision making become greater (e.g. when buying a car).  
Stanovich and West (2000) offer simple terminology and explanations for Sloman‟s 
(1996) two systems: “System 1” for the associative and intuitive system, and “System 2” for 
the rule-based and deliberative system. They delineate several additional important 
characteristics of both systems: System 1 is associative and holistic, relying very little on 
cognitive capacity for functioning, and relying greatly on problem context. Thus, System 1 
seems to be a good candidate for making gut decisions, but is susceptible to biases arising from 
framing manipulations that influence context but not content. System 2, on the other hand, is 
rule-based and analytic, requiring time and cognitive resources to process information and 
guide decisions in a more structured, systematic manner. Because it operates at a slower pace, 
System 2 might be a candidate for effective monitoring of the output of System 1. On this note, 
Kahneman and Frederick (2005) suggest that System 2 processing takes into account less 
salient information, such as probability and base rate, which are important in making optimal 
choices, but which are not often intuitively attended to. Additionally, because System 2 
requires a relatively large amount of cognitive energy to function appropriately, it is likely to 
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be an ineffective supervisor when maintaining large quantities of information at once, or in 
situations where cognitive resources are already in use elsewhere (for example, when we are 
overwhelmed with emotion, or when we are tired).  
 This dual-systems framework has been substantiated in a variety of contexts. Hogarth 
(2002), for example, has noted the presence of a “tacit” or intuitive processing system (System 
1), guided by implicit response, and a deliberative system (System 2), which censors thoughts 
and behaviors produced via the tacit system. Hogarth suggests that while the tacit system 
requires little effort to process information, it requires monitoring under many circumstances. 
However, he has also noted that the deliberative system requires a certain amount of resources 
to perform adequately—this “consciousness” is both limited in availability and costly to use. 
Thus, it is not actively employed in all decisions, though it serves as a monitor in all decision-
making contexts at some level, and is rarely completely non-functioning. Finally, conscious 
deliberation can be overwhelmed with excessive amounts of information, suggesting that 
perhaps the presentation of well-structured, simplified information allows for optimal 
utilization of both tacit and deliberative processing.  
Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) and Chen and Bargh (1999) have applied a dual-
systems framework to stereotyping and impression-formation. They suggest that stereotyping 
occurs when we rely on more accessible attitudes and impressions, which are guided by 
automatic (and often non-conscious) evaluations. For example, when participants were 
instructed to either pull or push a lever in response to a positive or negative word, participants 
responded significantly faster on congruent trials (pushing motor response paired with negative 
words, or pulling motor response paired with positive words) than on incongruent stimuli 
(pushing paired with positive words, or pulling paired with negative words). Chen and Bargh 
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(1999) propose that faster reaction times on congruent trials are indicative of a more intuitive 
or automatic processing strategy to bring the positive closer and push the negative away: if 
both the word and motor task require behavior consistent with this heuristic, performance is 
faster, as it is guided almost exclusively by automatic or intuitive processing. Conversely, on 
incongruent trials, reaction times were slower: when the word and motor task require behavior 
consistent with different and conflicting heuristics, performance takes more time, suggesting 
that deliberation is employed to override intuition.  
Further, dual-process models have been substantiated more recently using 
neuropsychological measures. Smith and DeCoster (2000), for example, propose a similar 
dichotomous model that employs memory systems analogous to the associative and rule-based 
systems previously mentioned. In their model, associative systems appear to rely on well-
learned information that is readily accessible from memory, while rule-based systems are 
likely to rely instead on information that is acquired through inference and reasoning (and is 
hence only accessible when the individual is motivated and possesses cognitive capacity for 
the task). While Smith & DeCoster speak to what information dual-systems models rely on, 
McClure et al (2004) examined underlying structures associated with automatic (in their case, 
impulsive) and deliberative (in their case, patient) behaviors. Brain activity was measured 
during a series of intertemporal choices, between “smaller, sooner” monetary options and 
“larger, later” monetary options. The authors found that two areas were activated differentially: 
Beta areas, which represented limbic and paralimbic function, were activated 
disproportionately in the presence of immediately-available rewards. These areas are 
innervated largely by the dopamine system, which is thought to be responsible for conditioning 
of reward and motivation (see Di Chiara & Bassareo, 2007); McClure et al suggest that these 
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areas are implicated in making impulsive decisions. Delta areas, on the other hand, which 
represented the lateral prefrontal cortex and associated areas, were activated when long-run 
options were considered. That is, delta areas were engaged when participants performed 
quantitative analyses of the problem set, considering the possible benefits to future 
opportunities over immediate ones. These areas are important in behavioral control and 
strategic planning (see Tanji & Hoshi, 2008), and so may be important in overriding intuitive, 
impatient responses of the limbic system. Indeed, McClure et al suggest that these two areas of 
activation represent competition between low-level, automatic processing (Beta areas) and the 
capacity for general reasoning and planning (Delta areas), analogous to the competition 
between intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2) described above.  
While these are only a few examples from the literature, when taken together, they 
suggest that a dual-systems account may be helpful in understanding how people make 
decisions; indeed, this account accommodates the possibility of choices made at two levels: 
intuitive and deliberative.  
 
Dual-systems Theories and Cognitive Reflection 
 One reliable finding among the various demonstrations of dual-systems theories is that 
employing System 2 processing requires much more effort than does relying on intuition. 
Consequently, to engage in System 2 processing requires some indication to move from very 
low levels of monitoring (System 1) to higher levels of active deliberation. Bargh, Chen and 
Burrows (1996) and Ebert (2001) suggest that in order to employ System 2 processing, we 
need to be motivated, we need to be aware of intuitive biases, and we need to have sufficient 
resources available to complete this more effortful task. For example, to employ more 
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deliberative decision making strategies in a task, a participant needs to be motivated to 
perform, must have the time to allow for deliberation, and must have cognitive resources 
necessary to override intuition. This would suggest that perhaps the best domain for 
deliberation to be employed is one in which task demands are low, and where motivation to 
attend to the task is high. Additionally, there may be individual differences at play: those with 
more free cognitive resources in general might be better able to deliberate, even as motivations 
to perform decrease, task difficulty increases, and biases become less salient.  
 One implication of this potential individual difference is that System 2 processing 
might be correlated with factors pertaining to cognitive capacity. Individuals with greater 
cognitive capacity might be predisposed to employing cognitive effort in decision making, 
whereas individuals with less cognitive capacity might make less effortful decisions. For 
example, perhaps individuals with larger working memory capacity (one potential measure of 
cognitive capacity) are able to hold more information at once, making deliberation itself easier. 
As a result, these individuals might be more likely to engage in more effortful decision 
making, which is especially helpful when task demands are high. Indeed, Barrett, Tugade and 
Engle (2004) summarize a host of benefits related to decision making that are associated with 
increased working memory capacity. Those with higher working memory capacity are better 
able to activate information from memory (such as exemplars or related information; see also 
Rosen & Engle, 1997), which is thought to aid in novel problem solving. In addition, those 
with higher working memory capacity are better able to ignore interfering information and 
suppress irrelevant or inappropriate information from influencing choices, which suggests that 
perhaps decision-making among these individuals is both more focused and less susceptible to 
bias. These findings are further supported by Leboeuf and Shafir (2003), who suggest that 
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individuals with higher need for cognition (NC; another conception of measuring cognitive 
capacity), measured by a scale assessing how much an individual enjoys engaging in effortful 
thought, are more likely to recognize when they have made inconsistent choices across 
objectively identical but differently framed decisions (see also Smith & Levin, 1996). Thus, 
perhaps one of the central benefits to greater cognitive capacity is the ability to decipher what 
information is most relevant to choice, and what information is irrelevant or uninformative. At 
a capacity level, intelligence might confer some benefits in risk-related choice. 
More intelligent individuals might also have better-developed skills employed by 
deliberation, such as math or statistical ability. Dohmen et al (2007) provide some evidence for 
this hypothesis, noting that individuals with poor math skills prefer to take fewer risks despite 
higher expected values associated with high-risk options. Similarly, more intelligent 
individuals might make more risk-tolerant decisions because they are generally more capable 
of maintaining deliberative ability in novel situations. For example, in situations where the 
objectively better option is not obvious, more cognitively able individuals might process 
choice-relevant information more effectively, and as a result are less susceptible to framing 
effects (Smith & Levin, 1996). Consequently, individuals with greater cognitive abilities are 
more efficient in identifying the best option.  
Individuals with lower cognitive ability might thus have difficulty taking a broader 
perspective on a decision making task. As Smith & Levin suggest, individuals with greater 
need for cognition, who tend to use more effortful thought in decision making, are less biased 
by framing influences. These more deliberative participants tend to be less impulsive decision 
makers, suggesting that overcoming impatience is another benefit to enhanced cognitive 
ability. Indeed, Benjamin and Shapiro (2005) found that among Chilean high school students 
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and Harvard undergraduates, those with greater cognitive ability, as measured by GPA and 
other standardized aptitude measures, tended to be more patient over time, as well as more 
risk-tolerant over small-stakes gambles. To quote Benjamin and Shapiro, “„cognitive ability‟ 
measures the ease or frequency with which the deliberative system overrides the automatic 
system” (2005), suggesting that cognitive ability has a critical role in dual-systems accounts for 
risk tolerance. 
 Frederick (2005) has provided an extensive summary of data examining the interaction 
of intelligence and cognitive capacity measures in relation to risk tolerance. Overall, his 
findings converge on a central theme: higher performance on measures of intelligence is 
associated with more long-term risk tolerance and reduced delay discounting. This again 
suggests that individuals with greater cognitive ability are better able to suppress an intuitive 
instinct to avoid risk (and to prefer immediate gains), and instead rely on a secondary, more 
deliberative response (the preference for larger, future options). Frederick proposes that the 
benefits conferred by possessing greater cognitive ability allow for reflection on the problem 
set (a System 2 process), and thus that intelligence plays a crucial role in processing style. 
According to this perspective, individuals who are more intuitive thinkers might be more 
susceptible to framing manipulations and biases in general, as they are more easily influenced 
by choice context (Stanovich & West, 2000). Conversely, those who are more deliberative 
might be less affected by biases, as they possess more resources to reflect on the problem and 






The Bracketing Effect 
 Frederick‟s finding that cognitive reflection ability is directly related to ability to 
deliberate on a problem lends itself well to considering biases in risk tolerance. If we are aware 
that intuition appears to guide the decision making strategies of most people (see Soman, 
2004), and that those with greater working memory capacity might view problems differently 
(i.e. with less interference from irrelevant contextual variables, and more focus on relevant 
information), perhaps there are alternative ways to frame choices that make the more beneficial 
option (in terms of expected value or utility) more likely to be chosen. Indeed, this idea has 
been lurking in the literature for decades: Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) noted that preferences change depending on how the problem itself is 
framed. For example, the Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) compares two 
identical problems (a sure thing or a risky option that offers the chance to save or lose more 
lives), but frames possible outcomes as either gains (lives saved) or losses (people who will 
die). When the problem is framed positively, participants are much more inclined to choose the 
sure thing, as it guarantees that they will avoid saving zero lives. That is, individuals prefer 
certainty when goals are positively framed. Conversely, when the problem is framed 
negatively, participants are more inclined to choose the risky option. That is, participants seem 
to be mentally reframed to take a risk because they are presented with a problem where the 
default is a net loss of life. Tversky and Kahneman conclude that when problems are framed 
negatively, people prefer uncertainty and risk over acceptance of a sure loss. These findings 
suggest that by changing the structure of the problem, perhaps the intuitive response itself 
might change from one of risk aversion (in the case of gains) to one of risk tolerance (in the 
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case of losses). In a general sense, how a problem is framed has an obvious impact on how 
participants respond to it.  
More recently, Kahneman (2003) has again noted that framing relies on “passive 
acceptance of the formulation given”, but that this bias can be corrected with metacognition, a 
more deliberative (System 2) process that involves awareness of personal thought. Reframing a 
problem might then encourage more risk-tolerant decision making by promoting engagement 
of System 2 processing. Much discussion has thus been focused on how choices or investments 
can be presented so as to maximize risk tolerance.  
Manipulating how problems are presented to induce frame-based preference shifts has 
been examined in the context of bracketing (Thaler et al, 1997; Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Read, 
Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999; Leboeuf & Shafir, 2003). For example, Thaler et al (1997) 
presented investment options (choosing a risky stock versus a safe bond) to participants at 
intervals of one month, one year, or five years in simulated time, manipulating the frequency 
(in time) with which investments were made. The authors hypothesized that as the timeframe 
of investments increased (and as frequency of investing decreased), participants would become 
more risk tolerant, as losses themselves would be made less salient due to the averaging of 
outcomes over longer periods of time (see also Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). By seeing fewer pure 
losses, participants should then be more inclined to make riskier decisions, improving their 
overall outcomes. Indeed, participants who chose their investments and viewed outcomes 
monthly were significantly more myopic, choosing low-risk, low-payoff bonds more often than 
high-risk, high-payoff stocks. Conversely, participants who chose and viewed their 
investments every five years tended to make more risk-tolerant choices, investing more often 
in stocks, demonstrating less loss and risk aversion. Thaler et al (1997) conclude that frequent 
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feedback of investments is likely to encourage our worst tendencies—making relatively 
riskless, but unprofitable, investment choices. Conversely, by encouraging adoption of a 
longer-term perspective in which outright losses are experienced less frequently, risk tolerance 
can be enhanced. 
 While Thaler et al‟s studies examine frequency of investment and feedback, at a more 
basic level they manipulate the scope with which problems and outcomes are presented. 
According to the bracketing hypothesis (Gneezy & Potters, 1997), when problems are grouped 
together, participants are more likely to make investments that offer high risk with high payoff, 
instead of choosing safer but less rewarding options. It has been suggested that by grouping 
problems together, or by offering a broader frame, participants are encouraged to take a 
broader decision-making perspective, and in turn consider long-term payoffs in addition to 
their immediate feelings of loss aversion. Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) suggest that a 
broad frame helps individuals to consider “all the hedonic consequences of their actions”—a 
broad frame might help individuals realize the role that their emotions play in choice, and this 
realization helps them override risk-averse responses in favor of alternative actions that 
promote utility maximization. In the language of cognitive reflection, presenting problems in 
groups encourages individuals to become aware of the similarities of the problems, consider 
them over a longer horizon, and encourages more explicit calculation of associated risks. By 
encouraging active reconsideration of the problems themselves, individuals are more likely to 
make more risk-tolerant, deliberative responses that focus on overcoming intuitive reactions to 
avoid risk. Conversely, when investments are presented alone, or in a narrow bracket, 
participants appear to make decisions in isolation (even if decisions themselves are 
interrelated), and thereby fail to benefit from the cancellation of outright losses associated with 
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one choice by gains associated with others. This framing encourages participants to “go with 
their gut”, behaving in a risk-averse manner, as attention is drawn to potential losses associated 
with risk (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), which leads to very little investment (or making 
low-risk, low-payoff choices), and later, smaller net earnings.  
 Gneezy and Potters (1997) investigated bracketing effects in the domain of grouped 
investments, examining whether risk tolerance would increase when several choices were 
presented at once, versus when those same choices were presented individually and 
sequentially. In this study, participants were given 200 cents per investment; additionally, 
investments were either presented sequentially (High frequency) or in groups of three (Low 
frequency). The authors suggested that in the High frequency investment scenario, participants 
would make smaller investments because, similar to participants in Thaler et al‟s (1997) 
monthly condition, pure losses of invested money would be seen with much more frequency, 
inducing greater levels of loss aversion. Conversely, in the Low frequency investment 
scenario, because investments for each set of three are forced to be identical, participants 
should instead adopt a broader perspective, and so should be more likely to consider long-term 
payoffs instead of short-term outcomes, allowing for larger investments. Additionally, because 
outcomes of three investment trials are aggregated, outright losses are made less salient, 
allowing participants to focus instead on the benefits to investing, thereby producing larger 
investments. Gneezy and Potters confirmed their hypothesis: investments in the Low frequency 
condition were significantly greater than in the High frequency condition, leading the authors 
to conclude that broad problem framing reduced risk aversion by making outright losses seem 
less likely.  
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On this subject, Frederick (2005) notes that while amount of reflection might be 
manipulated by altering the frame of a problem, some individuals might be more reflective on 
their own, suggesting that framing effects might differentially impact risk-tolerance of some 
individuals more than others. Deliberative, reflective individuals should be less susceptible to 
framing effects in general, as they tend to second-guess their intuitions more frequently. Thus, 
deliberative individuals should show more consistent levels of risk tolerance, regardless of how 
problems are framed. Conversely, individuals who reflect less should base decisions more on a 
gut instinct, relying more on intuition and context of the problem. 
 
Alternative Bracketing Hypotheses 
 While both Thaler et al (1997) and Gneezy and Potters (1997) provide evidence is 
support of the bracketing hypothesis, in both cases, the authors maintain that bracketing 
promotes risk-tolerant behavior by providing a more holistic or long-term view at the time the 
decision problem is presented; however, part of how problems have been broadly bracketed in 
these studies involves bracketing of outcome feedback as well. For example, in Thaler et al 
(1997), investment returns were presented such that “subjects saw a bar graph that displayed 
the aggregated returns of each fund and of their portfolio for the period(s) to which the 
decision applied (emphasis added)”. Thus, participants in the monthly condition (Narrow 
bracket) saw more frequent, short-term feedback relative to participants in the 5-year condition 
(Broad bracket). Participants in the monthly condition thus were more likely to see small but 
frequent losses as a result of their investment decisions. Similarly, in Gneezy and Potters‟ 
(1997) studies, participants making high-frequency choices (Narrow bracket) were given 
feedback after each choice; additionally, due to the format of investments, a pure loss was 
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experienced on approximately 2/3 of trials. Conversely, participants making low-frequency 
choices (Broad bracket) made investment decisions in groups of three, and saw feedback 
aggregated across three trials, containing trials that had won and lost. Gneezy and Potters note:  
“The probability of [experiencing] a loss decreases from 0.67 for a single lottery, to 
(0.67)
3
 = 0.30 for three consecutive lotteries. If the financial consequences of the three 
lotteries are evaluated in combination rather than separately, then the lotteries should 
become more attractive”. 
In short, in these studies, the bracketing manipulation has involved both how the 
decision problem was framed (in which a wide frame involved multiple investment decisions, 
or a single decision over a long horizon) and how the outcome of the decision is presented (in 
which the wide frame presents the results of multiple decisions in aggregate, or the results of a 
single decision that applied to a longer horizon.  
The emphasis of these studies seems to be largely on the prospective, rather than 
retrospective, influence of bracketing on risk tolerance (i.e. the results are described as ones of 
problem rather than outcome framing). However, presentation of outcomes is often a critical 
factor in decision making. Indeed, Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) note that part of the 
benefit of problem aggregation to risk-tolerance lies in comprehending consequences of 
actions: when sets are large, participants are better able to consider the joint outcomes of 
repeated or related decisions, which may encourage risk-tolerant decision making. This 
integration of outcomes is thus a critical component to bracketing effects.  
The importance of integration of outcome information becomes obvious when 
considering an example often used in investment literature. When considering retirement 
savings, individuals have incentive to invest in somewhat risky, but ultimately more lucrative, 
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options, rather than in safer but less profitable ones (Thaler et al, 1997); thus, there is incentive 
to encourage risk-tolerant investing behavior. Further, in the real world, these investments can 
be changed as time passes; if one particular sector is failing, individuals will often pull their 
investments out in favor of investing in an alternative. Thus, while initial allocation of 
resources might have depended on perceived risk of each investment, over time the importance 
of outcomes becomes obvious: as investors, we want to see how our money behaves. When 
investments grow, we tend not to change them; however, when investments shrink, we tend to 
reexamine our initial choices. Indeed, the investments themselves have not changed (that is, the 
problem frame has been consistent, and risk of the investment has not changed); however, 
presence of outcome information impacts how we choose to reallocate resources. Perhaps, 
then, bracketing effects are not exclusively due to how problems themselves are presented, but 
are also dependent on how feedback is presented. Indeed, this hypothesis seems more in line 
with the basic principles of loss aversion: losses loom larger than gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991), so seeing losses more frequently than gains, as in a Narrow bracket, is likely to produce 
more risk-averse behavior in general. Conversely, because the problems themselves display 
only probabilities of loss, they should induce less loss and risk aversion, and hence should have 
much less impact on changes to risk tolerance. Myopic loss aversion has been hypothesized as 
a construct of the problem frame, occurring prospectively; however, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) indicate that retrospective accounts of loss aversion and risk tolerance should also be 
considered. 
 This hypothesis has received some attention in the literature already. For example, 
Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003) modified the experimental design of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) to compare risk tolerance when feedback was presented after one individual trial 
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(Narrow bracket) versus when feedback was aggregated every three trials (Broad bracket). In 
their 1997 study, investments were made with high or low frequency. High frequency 
decisions, or narrowly-bracketed investments, involved making an investment on a per-trial 
basis; feedback for each trial was offered after each investment. Low-frequency decisions, or 
broadly-bracketed investments, instead involved making investments that would be played 
repeatedly. Thus, participants were instructed to make investments that they would be content 
with if played out in the same scenario three times. It was hypothesized that low-frequency 
decision frames encouraged participants to take a long-term, holistic focus of the problem, 
which in turn would encourage more risk-tolerant investment behavior. However, the authors 
noted that differential feedback may have played a role in results, and so adapted their design 
to examine whether information feedback (outcome framing) or flexibility of portfolio 
adjustment (problem framing) was responsible for shifts in risk tolerance. In this study, for 
each investment period participants were given three identical lotteries to bid on, with 
probabilities of payoff identical to those in previous work (see Gneezy & Potters, 1997). At the 
end of each period, participants were informed of the outcomes to investments, and then 
progressed to the following period. However, for some participants (Low frequency), outcomes 
for each investment period counted for three investment periods. That is, for participants in the 
Low frequency condition, investments were made every third trial, and feedback was given at 
the end of each period. Thus, both choice and feedback were aggregated in a fashion similar to 
that of the original work of Gneezy and Potters (1997). In line with predictions of loss 
aversion, and predictions of their previous work, risk tolerance decreased when feedback was 
presented in high-frequency format (Narrow bracket) compared to when it was presented in a 
low-frequency aggregate every three trials (Broad bracket).  
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This study, however, appears closer to a replication of Gneezy and Potters (1997) when 
examined, as low-frequency feedback was accompanied again with low-frequency investing 
(Broad bracketing). Thus, the hypothesis that feedback format might affect risk tolerance more 
than problem presentation warrants further exploration. 
 
Bracketing and Cognitive Ability 
 While one focus of this thesis is to disentangle the influence of problem and outcome 
framing effects, another is to examine whether individual differences play a role in 
susceptibility to these framing effects as well. For example, individuals who rely more on 
intuition might be more susceptible to framing effects in general, as was suggested previously, 
but might also be more susceptible to the more informative frame (that is, the frame that 
presents information in a more comprehensible manner). For example, if problem framing 
encourages risk tolerance through holistic processing, as is hypothesized by Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), intuitive individuals should be biased toward increased risk tolerance when 
problems are presented in groups. Conversely, if outcome framing instead encourages risk 
tolerance through aggregating and summarizing important information, intuitive individuals 
should instead only show increased risk tolerance when outcomes are aggregated, but be 
unbiased by problem framing. Deliberative individuals, on the other hand, who are inclined to 
reframe problems regardless of how they are presented, might instead only be sensitive to 
presentation of outcomes, which are uncertain. For example, if these individuals already 
convert problem information in some way, problem framing should have no effect; however, 
because outcomes cannot be known until presentation, perhaps only in this domain can risk 
tolerance be biased by framing manipulations.  
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 One potential moderator of bracketing effects is thus the tendency to decide by relying 
on intuition versus deliberating on the choice, which can be quantified using the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). Frederick hypothesizes that individuals who are 
intuitive processors (those who have low scores on the CRT) are likely to follow gut feelings, 
responding to test problems with the first (incorrect) response that comes it mind. Deliberative 
processors, who instead reflect on the problems (and score high on the CRT), are able to 
suppress this gut instinct, and so are able to come up with the correct response. Frederick found 
greater risk tolerance among those who scored high rather than low on the CRT, consistent 
with the possibility that those who are more prone to deliberation may process problem or 
outcome information in a broader manner than those who are less prone to deliberation. 
 
Overview of Experiments  
Two experiments were designed to disentangle the effects of problem and outcome 
bracketing on risk tolerance in investment decisions. Investments were presented individually 
or in sets of three (the problem frame); additionally, outcomes were presented individually or 
in aggregate form (the outcome frame). Experiment 1 investigated the effects of these 
bracketing manipulations in a discrete choice task, along the lines of that used by Thaler et al 
(1997) and Frederick (2005), involving similar but non-identical gambles.  Experiment 2 
investigated how the bracketing manipulations influence decisions on how much to invest in 







 Eighty seven University of Waterloo undergraduates (15 males, 72 females) 
participated for course credit. Additionally, participants were informed that there was a chance 
of winning real money based on their performance on the task (to a maximum of $10). 
 
Procedure 
 The current study used a 2 x 2 x 2 (Gain vs. Loss; Broad vs. Narrow problem; Broad 
vs. Narrow outcome) between-subjects factorial design.  
 Participants were brought into testing rooms either alone or in pairs, and were seated at 
individual computer terminals separated by dividers to allow for privacy. Once seated, an 
experimenter informed the participants that the experiment itself would have two components: 
a computer-based gambling task, and a paper-based questionnaire task. The computer task 
consisted of a series of 120 similar monetary choices. Participants would be endowed with 
$500 play money, which they would use to gamble with. On each choice, they would be 
presented with one certain option (for example, $50 for sure) and one gamble option (for 
example, a 1/3 chance of winning $155, or a 2/3 chance of winning nothing; a full list of 
stimuli can be found in Appendix A). Their task would be to choose the option that they 
preferred to participate in. It was emphasized that the participant should choose which option 
they preferred to have, and that there was no correct or incorrect choice on any given trial. 
Additionally, to reinforce choosing according to preferences, participants were informed that 
they would be paid a small amount (to a maximum of $10) in proportion to their earnings, in 
addition to receiving course credit. 
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Participants were informed that the task contained two blocks: one with gains, where 
they would win money, and one with losses, where they would lose money; order of these 
blocks was counterbalanced. Previous research (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) indicates 
that people are typically risk-averse in the domain of gains (i.e. they prefer a sure gain over a 
gamble with equal or greater expected value), and risk-seeking in the domain of losses (i.e. 
they prefer a gamble offering a chance of avoiding loss over a sure loss, even if the latter has a 
lower expected value). The gambles were constructed such that, in the domain of gains, the 
sure gain had an equal or lower expected value than the gamble option, and in the domain of 
losses, the sure loss had a equal or greater (less negative) expected value than the gamble. 
Additionally, while payoffs varied slightly from trial to trial, probability of winning the larger 
amount (or losing the smaller amount) remained constant across all trials. For example, Gain 
trials were presented as: 
Option A: Winning $50 for sure, OR 
Option B: A 1/3 (33%) chance of winning $165, or a 2/3 (67%) chance of losing $7.50. 
In all gain trials, Option B offered either an equal or greater expected value, and was thus 
arguably the objectively better choice. Similarly, Loss trials were presented as: 
 Option A: Losing $50 for sure, OR 
 Option B: A 1/3 (33%) chance of losing $165, or a 2/3 (67%) chance of winning $7.50. 
Thus, in all loss trials, Option A presented either an equal or greater expected value, and was 
thus objectively a better choice (a full list of choice values is presented in the Appendix).  
Wide bracketing has been shown to enhance risk tolerance in the domain of gains 
(Gneezy & Potters, 1997), but the effect of bracketing has not previously been investigated in 
the domain of losses. It is possible that wide bracketing enhances risk tolerance in the domain 
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of losses as well.  Indeed, when outcomes are framed negatively, individuals are more likely to 
take risks (Levin et al, 2002); thus, participants might show larger bracketing effects in loss 
domains. Alternatively, wide bracketing might make losses arising from playing the gamble 
seem more certain (e.g., “I might get lucky and avoid a loss by playing the gamble once, but by 
playing it three times I‟m almost certain to lose something”), and as such enhance the 
attractiveness of accepting the sure loss.  In short, by investigating bracketing effects in the 
domain of losses, it is possible to determine whether wide bracketing consistently enhances 
risk tolerance, or whether instead it enhances the impact of expected value considerations on 
choice. 
Once the computer-based investment task was completed, participants completed a 
paper-based questionnaire task, consisting of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) 
and the Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001; see also Peters et al, 2006), measures 
of deliberative versus intuitive processing and math abilities, respectively.  
 
Bracketing Conditions 
 Problems were either broadly or narrowly bracketed in a manner similar to that of 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Additionally, we parsed the bracketing manipulation into two 
separate factors: a problem bracket and an outcome bracket, producing four conditions (tested 
in a between-subjects design). 
 
Narrow problem, narrow outcome 
 In this condition, we aimed to replicate as closely as possible the Narrow Bracket 
condition of Gneezy and Potters (1997) using a discrete choice paradigm. In the narrow 
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problem bracket, choices were presented individually. Participants were presented with 120 
individual choices between a certain option and a gamble. Similarly, in the narrow outcome 
bracket, outcomes were presented individually. Thus, participants saw 120 individual 
outcomes paired with each choice. An example can be found in Figure 1. 
 
Broad problem, broad outcome 
 This condition was intended to replicate the Broad bracket condition of Gneezy and 
Potters (1997) using a discrete choice paradigm (see also Frederick, 2005). In the broad 
problem bracket, choices were presented on-screen in groups of three. Participants saw all 
three choices at once, and all three remained on-screen until all had been responded to. 
Participants were able to make individual responses for each choice, but were instructed to 
think about the choices in any order they wished, as the order of presentation on-screen was 
not important. This was done to facilitate holistic processing of the choices, which is thought to 
mediate risk tolerance in broadly-bracketed problem framing.  
 In the broad outcome bracket, one slide was presented on-screen, informing 
participants of the individual outcomes of each choice they had previously made, as well as of 
an aggregate of those three choices (for example, “Overall, you won $225”). It was 
hypothesized that this aggregate might be of critical importance to risk tolerance in a Broad 
bracket in previous research as it summarizes feedback and thus displays less pure loss. An 






Broad problem, narrow outcome 
 In the first of two novel conditions, participants were presented with three choices on 
screen at once (the broad problem bracket), and were presented with three outcomes at once, 
but were not provided with an aggregate of these outcomes; thus, outcomes were framed 
narrowly. The main difference between this condition and the Broad/Broad condition was thus 
the absence of an aggregate outcome. An example can be found in Figure 3. 
 It was hypothesized that this condition would pit two possible accounts for bracketing 
against one another. According to traditional theories of bracketing, simply presenting choices 
together encourages risk-tolerant behavior; thus, regardless of how feedback is presented, the 
risky option should be chosen more often. Conversely, if bracketing effects result from 
outcome aggregation rather than problem framing, presenting choices in groups should have no 
effect on risk-tolerance when feedback is narrowly bracketed.  
 
 
Narrow problem, broad outcome 
 This second novel condition further examined the influence of aggregated presentation 
of outcomes. In this condition, participants were presented with an individual choice (the 
narrow problem bracket), followed by an individual outcome for each associated choice. For 
every set of three consecutive choices, an aggregate of the last three outcomes was also 
presented (the broad outcome bracket). Thus, the only difference between this condition and 
the Narrow/Narrow condition was the presence of an aggregate outcome following every third 
trial. If bracketing effects are driven by effects of problem framing, then participants in this 
condition should not be more risk-tolerant. However, if aggregating outcomes drives the effect, 
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 Average net winnings across Gain and Loss blocks was $1.67. Significant carryover 
was found between blocks: a oneway ANOVA confirmed that participants who completed the 
Loss block before the Gain block were significantly more risk tolerant, F(1, 85) = 28.26, MSE 
= 1.75, p < 0.001; thus, analyses presented represent only the first block of trials for each 







Proportion of risky options taken across Problem and Outcome frames 
 
Gain trials       
    Outcome frame 
 
Problem frame    
    
 
Narrow Broad Average 
    Narrow 0.40 0.13 0.27 
    Broad 0.45 0.34 0.40 




Loss trials       
    Outcome frame 
 
Problem frame    
    
 
Narrow Broad Average 
    Narrow 0.67 0.19 0.43 
    Broad 0.68 0.58 0.63 
    Average 0.68 0.39 
  




 A 2 (Gains vs. Losses) x 2 (Broad vs. Narrow Problem) x 2 (Broad vs. Narrow 
Outcome) factorial ANOVA was conducted to identify potential interactions. Risk tolerance 
was defined as the proportion of trials in which participants chose the risky option over the 
sure thing; higher scores indicated greater risk tolerance. Table 1 presents mean proportion of 
risky choices made based on problem and outcome bracket, separated by value (Gain or Loss) 
of the choice presented. 
 Significant differences were found between participants in Gain and Loss conditions, t 
(85) = 3.92, p < 0.001, suggesting that participants were more risk-seeking in blocks where 
losses were presented, in line with Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This 
finding was found consistently across all Problem and Outcome conditions, measured with 
one-way tests, all ps < 0.04. 
Significant differences were found across Problem and Outcome brackets, F (1, 85) = 
21.20, MSE = 1.21, p < 0.001, and F (1, 85) = 8.71, MSE = 0.56, p < 0.005, respectively. 
These main effects suggest that while Problem framing encouraged risk tolerance more 
through the Narrow bracket, Outcome framing instead encouraged risk tolerance more through 
the Broad bracket. Additionally, a significant Problem x Outcome frame interaction was found, 
F (1, 83) = 7.98, MSE = 0.37, p < 0.005, suggesting that Problem and Outcome framing 
affected risk tolerance differentially when manipulated together. That is, Problem framing has 
greater impact on risk tolerance when outcomes are presented in aggregates than when 
outcomes are presented successively. This would suggest that a broad problem frame is not 
effective in encouraging risk-tolerant behavior, regardless of how outcomes are presented. 
Instead, a narrow problem frame is especially effective when outcomes are presented in a 
simplified, aggregated form. These findings suggest that previous accounts of bracketing (i.e. 
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Thaler et al, 1997; Gneezy & Potters, 1997) might have been inaccurate in assuming that 
presentation of several choices together encourages holistic processing and long-term 
perspectives in decision making. Instead, perhaps outcomes are more critical to influencing 
risk tolerance.  
 No other higher order interactions were found, suggesting that trends were similar 
across Gain and Loss blocks with regard to changes in risk tolerance. For this reason, one-way 
analyses were conducted to examine main effects separately.  
 
Problem Framing 
 In both Gain and Loss domains, risk tolerance, as measured by proportion of risky 
options chosen, was significantly greater in Narrow frames, suggesting that choices presented 
individually produced more risk-tolerant behavior than problems presented in groups. This 
effect was marginally greater among Loss trials, F (1, 85) = 1.98, MSE = 1.22, p = 0.09, 
suggesting that differences between broad and narrow problem brackets were somewhat 
magnified relative to gain trials. Again, this finding is supported by Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), as it suggests that risk tolerance is greater in general in loss 
domains, and is also more susceptible to framing effects.  
 
Outcome Framing 
In both Gain and Loss domains, risk tolerance, as measured by proportion of risky 
options chosen, was significantly greater in Broad frames, suggesting that outcomes presented 
individually produced less risk-tolerant behavior than those presented in aggregate. These 
effects were not significantly different across Gain or Loss trials, all ps > 0.30, suggesting that 
effects were consistent in size across blocks.  
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CRT and Numeracy 
 The CRT was administered to examine whether participants identified by this measure 
as more deliberative thinkers were more or less affected by the bracketing manipulation than 
those identified as more intuitive thinkers. Additionally, to examine any benefits conferred by 
mathematical ability, the Numeracy scale was administered as a measure of participants‟ 
mathematical computation abilities. The two scales were positively correlated, r (86) = 0.39, p 








Proportion of risky choices made in Experiment 1 based on CRT  
 
Gain trials           
 Problems Outcomes 
 
       
 
Low CRT High CRT 
 
Low CRT High CRT 
 








       Difference -0.24 -0.08   0.13 0.14 
 
       
       Loss trials           
 Problems Outcomes 
 
       
 
Low CRT High CRT 
 
Low CRT High CRT 
 








       Difference -0.30 -0.25   0.29 0.06 
 
       






Proportion of risky choices made in Experiment 1 based on Numeracy  
 
Gain trials           
Problems Outcomes 
      
 
Low Numeracy High Numeracy 
 
Low Numeracy High Numeracy 
      Narrow 0.39 0.47 
 
0.27 0.26 
      Broad 0.26 0.19 
 
0.36 0.51 
      Difference -0.13 -0.28   0.09 0.25 
      
      Loss trials           
Problems Outcomes 
    
    
 
Low Numeracy High Numeracy 
 
Low Numeracy High Numeracy 
      Narrow 0.71 0.66 
 
0.65 0.61 
      Broad 0.39 0.40 
 
0.36 0.52 






Recall that the CRT is thought to measure intuitive versus deliberative processing 
styles. Participants who attain low scores on the test are thought to approach problems 
intuitively, relying on automatic responses and gut instinct, whereas participants who attain 
high scores on the test are thought to approach problems critically, applying some effort to 
reframe problems and suppress incorrect intuitive responses. 
Frederick (2005) notes that high CRT scorers are able to wait longer periods of time in 
order to receive a larger (hypothetical) reward. Additionally, this trend is also evidenced in the 
domain of risk tolerance: high CRT scorers are more likely to take a risky option (with higher 
expected value) over a sure thing. This would suggest that perhaps participants with high CRT 
scores on a discrete choice task would be more risk tolerant.  
To further examine impact of intuitive versus reflective processing, risk tolerance 
scores were divided by CRT score (see Table 2), and analyzed in a 2 (Gains vs. Losses) x 2 
(Broad vs. Narrow Problem) x 2 (Broad vs. Narrow Outcome) x 2 (High vs. Low CRT) 
factorial ANOVA. To examine CRT scores, we compared participants who were rated as more 
intuitive (scoring 0 or 1, N = 49) to those who were rated as more deliberative (scoring 2 or 3, 
N = 32). (Additionally, as in Frederick (2005), we compared participants who were rated as 
most intuitive (those with a CRT score of 0, N = 32) and those who were rated as most 
deliberative (those with a CRT score of 3, N = 14); however, no differences were found.)  
No significant differences were found across CRT groups, F (1, 85) < 1, MSE = 0.05, p 
> 0.40, suggesting that more deliberative participants were no more likely to engage in more 
risk-tolerant decision making than intuitive participants. Additionally, no higher order 
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interactions involving CRT score were significant. Thus, to further examine any differences, 
main effects were examined in a series of one-way ANOVA tests. 
In Gain blocks, no significant differences were found between low and high CRT 
groups amongst Problem frames, all ps > 0.20. However, when outcomes were broadly framed, 
more deliberative participants (with CRT scores of 3) behaved in a more risk tolerant manner, 
F (1, 85) = 7.76, MSE = 0.13, p < 0.05. Thus, in the Gain domain, intuitive participants were 
not affected more by the Problem bracketing manipulation relative to deliberative participants; 
however, inclusion of an aggregate in presentation of Outcome encouraged more deliberative 
participants to behave in a more risk tolerant manner relative to intuitive participants. Thus, in 
the Gain domain, deliberative participants were more affected than intuitive participants by the 
outcome bracketing manipulation, suggesting that presentation of an aggregate in outcome 
frame might be most influential when participants are better able to reflect on this unique piece 
of information. 
In Loss blocks, no significant differences were found between low and high CRT 
groups, all ps > 0.20. Thus, in the Loss domain, deliberative and intuitive participants were not 
affected differentially by the bracketing manipulations.  
 
Numeracy 
 A similar examination of risk tolerance was performed using the Numeracy Scale. 
Scores were subjected to a median split; thus, the High Numeracy group consisted of 
individuals scoring greater than 9 (N = 40), whereas the Low Numeracy group consisted of 
individuals scoring less than 9 (N = 41). No significant differences were found between 
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Numeracy conditions, all ps > 0.20, suggesting that mathematical ability played no role in 
overall risk tolerance. 
 To further examine effects of Numeracy on risk tolerance, a linear regression was 
performed. No relationship was found between Numeracy and proportion of risky choices 
taken, F (1, 85) = 0.61, MSE = 0.04, p > 0.40, again suggesting that mathematical ability was a 
poor predictor of overall risk tolerance and choice behavior. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the bracketing effect in domains of gains 
and losses with respect to framing of problems and outcomes, as well as with regards to 
cognitive reflection and cognitive ability of individual participants.  
Specifically, the purpose of Experiment 1 was to gain a better understanding of whether 
problem or outcome framing had a stronger influence on bracketing effects. Problem framing 
has historically been the focus of previous hypotheses; however, the present research suggests 
that outcome framing seems to play a critical role in enhancing risk tolerance instead.  
Results of Experiment 1 suggest that indeed, the Problem frame of a choice matters—
however, results of this study contradict previous theoretical accounts of bracketing, which 
suggest that by presenting problems in groups, participants should be better able to think of 
problems holistically (see Thaler et al, 1997 and Gneezy & Potters, 1997). Instead, it appears 
that when making discrete choices, individually-presented choices encourage participants to 
make more risk-tolerant decisions.  
Perhaps individually-presented choices produce more risk-tolerant behavior because 
they present small amounts of information, and smaller chances of loss, which pertain to one 
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decision, whereas broadly-bracketed choices present a large amount of information, and larger 
chances of loss, that cannot be handled as easily. In a Narrow Problem frame, participants may 
be more inclined to take a gamble over a sure bet in both gain and loss domains because they 
are only holding one risk in mind at once. Conversely, in a Broad Problem frame, three risks 
are being maintained at once, which might encourage more risk-averse behavior. In a Broad 
Problem frame, perhaps participants become overwhelmed with the amount of risk information 
presented, and as a result revert to a risk-averse heuristic. 
These results suggest that previous findings showing that broader brackets enhance risk 
tolerance are likely due to the effect of outcome bracketing rather than problem framing. When 
outcomes are presented sequentially or individually, participants may have difficulty thinking 
of choices in a long-term approach, and tend to make risk-averse decisions on subsequent 
trials. However, when aggregate outcome information is provided, participants behave in a 
more risk-tolerant fashion. Thus, perhaps the presence of an aggregate outcome, not the 
presence of aggregated problems, encourages participants to consider individual choices as part 
of a set. This holistic processing might then result in more risk-tolerant decision making, 
possibly by leading participants to adopt a long-term decision policy in which expected value 
has relatively more impact, and that provides some buffering from losses on individual trials or 
choices. 
Lastly, it was hypothesized that level of cognitive ability should mediate the impact of 
the bracketing manipulation. That is, more intuitive participants might be more inclined to 
make context dependent decisions, as they are less inclined to reassess information presented 
to them in general. Only one demonstration of differential responses across framing based on 
cognitive reflection abilities was found, suggesting that perhaps participants who are more 
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deliberative in nature might be better equipped to selectively attend to important information 
such as aggregates, or summary information. Individuals with lower cognitive reflection 
abilities, on the other hand, might attend equally to all information presented, and so are less 
inclined to behave in a more risk-tolerant fashion when an aggregate is presented. That is, 
perhaps individuals with lower cognitive reflection abilities do not overweight outcome 
aggregates when considering the risk of decisions. However, these effects, when present, are 
small, suggesting that perhaps the framing manipulation used in the current studies is not 
strong enough to pit System 1 and 2 against each other in order to produce large differences 
across cognitive ability levels (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
While these results suggest that the bracketing effect might be better explained through 
outcome framing, the task of Experiment 1 was distinct from those in previous research in 
several ways. Experiment 1 involved discrete choices, whereas previous research (Gneezy & 
Potters, 1997) has instead employed continuous investment decisions. That is, in Experiment 1 
participants had to choose between a sure thing and a gamble, while in Gneezy and Potters‟ 
study, participants instead chose how much of an initial endowment to invest in a gamble, and 
how much to keep (as a sure gain). Continuous investment decisions might allow for more 
specific examinations of changes in risk tolerance, whereas discrete choice tasks allow for only 
two options: accepting a sure thing, or accepting a risky gamble. Perhaps using a continuous 
measure of risk tolerance might allow small and non-significant differences across cognitive 
ability levels to be amplified; similarly, perhaps a continuous measure of risk tolerance might 
amplify bracketing effects observed in Experiment 1.  
In addition, the task of Experiment 1 differs from previous demonstrations of the 
bracketing effect in terms of the choices presented themselves. Experiment 1 offered very 
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similar, but non-identical choices presented either individually or in groups. However, previous 
research has used identical, repeated investment decisions for all trials. For example, Gneezy 
and Potters (1997) used the same investment decision for all 12 trials in their experiments. 
Thus, on broadly bracketed trials, participants saw one investment, and made a bet that would 
be played three times. However, in our Broad Problem condition, participants saw three similar 
choices and were asked to make individual decisions for each. Perhaps, instead of considering 
whether they should take the sure thing three times, or take the gamble three times, participants 
instead chose to gamble on the choice that dominated other presented options in either 
expected value or maximum payoff. Indeed, on Gain trials, average proportion of gambles 
chosen was exactly 1/3, suggesting that this might be the case. Thus, for Experiment 2, 
investments for all trials were identical to avoid encouraging participants to seek the single 
“best” option in the bracketed set. 
Perhaps most importantly, the failure of Experiment 1 to produce a problem bracketing 
effect in the same direction as in previous research, as noted above, might be due to the 
complexity arising from presentation of three distinct decisions for simultaneous consideration.  
It is possible that the typical problem framing effect reappears once the added complexity 






 Eighty University of Waterloo undergraduates participated for course credit. 
Additionally, participants were informed that there was a chance of winning real money in 
addition to credit.  
 
Procedure 
 The current study used a 2 x 2 (Broad vs. Narrow problem; Broad vs. Narrow outcome) 
between-subjects factorial design. 
 Participants were brought into testing rooms either alone or in pairs, and were seated at 
individual computer terminals separated by dividers to allow for privacy. Once seated, an 
experimenter informed the participants that the experiment itself would have two components: 
a computer-based gambling task, and a paper-based questionnaire task. The computer task 
consisted of a series of 12 identical investments, replicated from Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
Participants would be endowed with 100 cents per trial, which they would use to invest with. 
On each trial, they would be presented with the same investment opportunity: they would be 
able to invest as much or as little of the allotted 100 cents in an investment which would return 
2.5 times their original investment 1/3 of the time (plus the original investment), but which 
would pay out nothing 2/3 of the time. It was emphasized that the participant should invest as 
much as he/she felt comfortable with, and that there was no correct or incorrect amount to 
invest on any given trial. Additionally, to reinforce choosing according to preferences, 
participants were informed that they would be paid in proportion to their earnings, in addition 




 As in Experiment 1, both problem and outcome bracketing were varied between 
subjects. 
 
Narrow problem, narrow outcome 
 In this condition, we again aimed to replicate as closely as possible the Narrow Bracket 
condition of Gneezy and Potters (1997). In the narrow problem bracket, investments were 
presented individually. Thus, participants were presented with 12 individual investments. 
Similarly, in the narrow outcome bracket, outcomes were presented individually. Thus, 
participants saw 12 individual outcomes paired with each choice. 
 
Broad problem, broad outcome 
 Again, this condition was used as a replicate of the broad bracket condition of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997). Identical investments were presented on-screen in groups of three. 
Participants saw all three at once, and all three remained on-screen until a response had been 
made. Participants were informed that in this problem frame, because the investment 
opportunities were identical, and because they would be given identical amounts of money to 
invest in each, they would thus be required to make identical investments in all three jointly-
presented investments. To enforce this requirement, the computer program was designed to 
display the participant‟s response beside each of the investments. Thus, if the participant chose 
to invest 75 cents, he/she would see “75” displayed three times on the screen, beside each of 
the three investments. 
44 
 
 In the broad outcome bracket, one slide was presented on-screen, informing 
participants of the individual outcomes of each choice they had previously made, as well as of 
an aggregate of those three choices (for example, “Overall, you won 293 cents”).  
 
Broad problem, narrow outcome 
 Participants in this condition were presented with three investments on-screen at once 
(the broad problem bracket), and were presented with three outcomes at once, but were not 
provided with an aggregate of these outcomes; thus, outcomes were framed narrowly. The 
main difference between this condition and the Broad/Broad condition was thus the absence of 
an aggregate outcome.  
 
Narrow problem, broad outcome 
 In this condition, participants were presented with an individual investment (the narrow 
problem bracket), followed by an individual outcome. For every three trials, an aggregate of 
the last three trial outcomes was also presented (the broad outcome bracket). Thus, the only 
difference between this condition and the Narrow/Narrow condition is the presence of an 
aggregate outcome on an additional slide. 
Once the computer task was completed, participants completed the paper-based 
“questionnaire task”, consisting of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and 
the Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001; see also Peters et al, 2006), measures of 






The average net winnings across conditions was $6.57. A 2 (Broad vs. Narrow 
Problem) x 2 (Broad vs. Narrow Outcome) factorial ANOVA was conducted with risk 
tolerance as the dependent measure. Risk tolerance was defined as the average proportion of 
investment (maximum of 100 cents per trial) made across trials; higher scores indicated greater 
risk tolerance.  
A significant difference was found between Narrow and Broad problem frames, F (1, 
78) = 8.97, MSE = 5514.12, p < 0.01, whereby narrowly-presented problems induced more 
risk tolerant behavior. This finding suggests, contrary to findings in Experiment 1, but 
analogous to theory proposed in previous bracketing literature (Gneezy & Potters, 1997), that 
the bracketing effect in this context is largely due to problem framing. Indeed, in support of 
this hypothesis, no significant effect of outcome frame was found, F (1, 78) = 0.07, MSE = 
50.57, p > 0.50, suggesting that in a continuous investment task, outcomes had no role in 
influencing risk tolerance. Finally, there was no interaction between the two experimental 






Proportion of risky options taken across Problem and Outcome frames in Experiment 2 
 
Outcome frame Problem frame 
    
 
Narrow Broad Average 
    Narrow 52.40 68.90 60.65 
    Broad 49.74 66.69 58.22 








Proportion of risky options taken across CRT in Experiment 2 
 
 
Problems   Outcomes 
      
 
Low CRT High CRT   Low CRT High CRT 
      Narrow 47.30 54.38 
 
54.35 64.39 
      Broad 64.89 70.68 
 
57.85 59.09 
      Difference 17.59 16.30   3.50 -5.30 
      










   
 
Low Numeracy  High Numeracy 
   Narrow 49.33 52.49 
   Broad 63.52 70.33 
   Difference 14.19 17.84 
   
   
 
Outcomes 
   
 
Low Numeracy  High Numeracy 
   Narrow 57.22 61.96 
   Broad 54.42 61.26 
   Difference -2.80 -0.70 
    




CRT and Numeracy 
 Again, the CRT was used to examine whether deliberative or intuitive participants 
would be more or less affected by the bracketing manipulation. Additionally, to examine 
whether any benefits were conferred by other cognitive abilities, the Numeracy scale was used 
to examine participants‟ mathematical abilities. The two scales were positively correlated, r 
(79) = 0.49, p < 0.001, suggesting that participants with high cognitive reflection abilities also 
excelled in mathematical computation. 
 
CRT 
To further examine effects, Problem and Outcome frames were examined in 
conjunction with CRT score in a 2 (Narrow vs. Broad Problem) x 2 (Narrow vs. Broad 
Outcome) x 2 (High vs. Low CRT) factorial ANOVA. As in Experiment 1, we compared Low 
CRT scorers (those with scores of 0 or 1, N = 39) to those with High CRT scores (those with 
scores of 2 or 3, N = 41). (As in Experiment 1, and Frederick (2005), we compared participants 
who were rated as most intuitive (a CRT score of 0 N = 22) and those who were rated as most 
deliberative (a CRT score of 3, N = 21); however, no differences were found).  
Across Problem and Outcome frames, no significant differences were found between 
low and high CRT groups, all Fs < 1.9, ps > 0.19. Thus, intuitive participants behaved no 
differently than those who were deliberative, suggesting that neither group was more 
vulnerable to bracketing manipulations. Additionally, there were no significant interactions 






 A similar examination of risk tolerance was performed using the Numeracy Scale. As 
in Experiment 1, a median split divided High Numeracy (scores of 10 or 11, N = 47) and Low 
Numeracy groups (scores of 9 or less, N = 33). A 2 (Narrow vs. Broad Problem) x 2 (Narrow 
vs. Broad Outcome) x 2 (High vs. Low Numeracy) revealed no significant differences between 
Numeracy groups, p > 0.30, suggesting that numeracy ability played no role in risk tolerance. 
Additionally, no higher-order interactions were observed, suggesting that numeracy ability had 
no role in susceptibility to bracketing manipulations. 
 A linear regression was run to examine whether Numeracy score predicted risk 
tolerance. Again, however, this analysis was not significant, F (1, 78) = 1.05, MSE = 708.02, p 
> 0.30, suggesting that mathematical ability played no role in determining how much 
individuals invested.  
 
Discussion  
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate findings of Experiment 1 using 
methodology of previous research on the bracketing effect. It was hypothesized that, as in 
Experiment 1, when problems were presented sequentially, participants might be more focused 
on the investment, which may lead to better understanding of expected values of the problems 
themselves, which in turn might encourage more risk-tolerant behavior and more investment. 
Additionally, it was hypothesized that by including an aggregate in presentation of feedback, 
participants might be more inclined to view individual investments as part of a set, which in 
turn would encourage holistic processing, long-term forecasting, and more risk tolerance. 
Finally, it was hypothesized that by using a continuous investment task, perhaps bracketing 
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effects might be amplified, as the continuous task might allow participants to demonstrate 
preferences more explicitly. Alternatively, by simplifying the structure of problems, perhaps 
problem framing effects might reemerge, as in previous research (Gneezy & Potters, 1997). 
That is, perhaps the outcome framing effect demonstrated in Experiment 1 was due in part to 
the importance of outcomes, but was also due to interaction between simplified outcomes and 
complicated, diverse problems.  
 Indeed, results of Experiment 2 suggest the latter set of hypotheses is true: when 
problems were presented in groups, they encouraged more risk tolerance, supporting previous 
explanations of the bracketing effect: explicitly grouping problems together encourages 
participants to view them as a group, which leads to making investment decisions that are more 
risk-tolerant (Thaler et al, 1997). Moreover, outcome bracketing played little or no role in 
determining risk tolerance, again suggesting that the problem frame is critical to the bracketing 
effect. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the original account for bracketing holds some 
validity: risk tolerance is increased when problems are presented in an aggregate fashion. 
 In addition, it was hypothesized that perhaps cognitive ability may play a role in risk-
tolerance and susceptibility to the bracketing manipulation. That is, perhaps participants who 
are more intuitive processors might be more inclined to accept the frame in which a problem is 
presented, whereas participants who are more deliberative in nature might be more inclined to 
actively “reframe” the problem. Results of Experiment 2 suggest that regardless of individual 
cognitive reflection or ability, there are no differential susceptibilities to bracketing effects. It 
was hypothesized that by using a continuous investment task, perhaps any small or non-
significant effects found in Experiment 1 might be amplified in Experiment 2. Instead, 
however, any differences were minimized or eliminated in the present study, suggesting that 
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cognitive ability plays no role in susceptibility to bracketing effects in particular, and perhaps 
to framing effects in general.  
 Finally, it was hypothesized that perhaps results of Experiment 1 might be a result of 
the unique task. In Experiment 2, methodology of Gneezy and Potters (1997) was used, and no 
evidence for the impact of outcome bracketing was found, suggesting that perhaps the 
mechanism behind the bracketing effect differs based on task. In Experiment 2, because 
investments were identical, perhaps presentation of outcomes matters less because the 
information it provides is redundant (i.e. it is more readily calculated from individual outcome 
information than was the case in Experiment 1). It is possible that participants in the Broad 
Problem frame behave in a more risk-tolerant manner because the presentation of three 
identical investments cues them to consider the element of repeated play of the task. Thus, the 
format of outcomes might matter less because the problem frame is more informative. To 
examine this, a one way ANOVA was conducted comparing Broad/Broad and Broad/Narrow 
conditions. The only difference between these conditions was presence of an aggregate in the 
former condition. No significant differences were found, F (1, 37) < 1, MSE = 47.44, p > 0.50, 
suggesting that the presence of an aggregate had no effect on risk tolerance when the problem 
frame was broadly-bracketed. Further, when comparing Narrow/Narrow and Narrow/Broad 
conditions, which again differ only in the presence of an aggregate in the latter condition, no 
significant differences are found either, F (1, 39) < 1, MSE = 72.06, p > 0.50, suggesting that 






The aim of this thesis was to examine the underlying mechanisms of the bracketing 
effect. Previously, assumptions had been made that by presenting investment decisions in 
aggregates, participants would take a broader focus on the task, and would make more risk-
tolerant decisions.  
Experiment 1 examined the bracketing effect in domains of gains and losses using 
discrete choices. It was hypothesized that while the problem frame might be important in 
determining risk tolerance because it encourages participants to view problems as part of a set 
physically, the outcome frame might be equally, if not more relevant in making long-term risk-
tolerant choices, as feedback tends to be important in reinforcing risk tolerant decisions. 
Results of Experiment 1 suggest that the problem frame is important; however, results 
of this study contradict previous theoretical accounts of bracketing (see Thaler et al, 1997 and 
Gneezy & Potters, 1997), instead suggesting that individually-presented problems encourage 
more risk-tolerant choices. Perhaps this presentation format is helpful because participants 
were given only small amounts of information at once, which encourages them to take 
worthwhile risks. Conversely, more risk-averse behavior when problems are presented in 
groups might be due to information overload. In this case, perhaps participants have difficulty 
examining problems together, and so fail to notice similarities between them.  
Results of Experiment 1 suggest that the format of feedback is also important to the 
bracketing effect. When outcomes are presented individually, participants have difficulty 
representing choices with a long-term, broad focus, and instead tend to make risk-averse 
decisions. When aggregates are provided, participants are cued to broaden their focus, and so 
behave in a more risk-tolerant fashion. 
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Experiment 2 was designed to bridge the theoretical gap between Experiment 1 and 
previous demonstrations of the bracketing effect. Instead of a discrete choice paradigm, the 
investment task used by Gneezy and Potters (1997) was adapted. It was hypothesized that a 
continuous task might amplify smaller deviations in risk tolerance.  Additionally, Experiment 2 
employed identical investments, as in Gneezy and Potters, to control for any investment 
behavior related to participants investing only in the “best” (as defined by greater expected 
value or larger maximum payout) of three options presented in a broad bracket. Again, it was 
hypothesized that when problems were presented sequentially, participants might be more 
focused on the investment, which might encourage more risk-tolerant behavior. Additionally, 
by including an aggregate in presentation of feedback, participants might be more inclined to 
view individual investments as part of a set, which in turn would encourage holistic processing 
and more risk tolerant investments 
 However, neither of these hypotheses was supported by data in Experiment 2. Problems 
presented in groups encouraged more risk tolerance, and outcomes played little or no role in 
determining risk tolerance, supporting previous explanations of the bracketing effect. Thus, in 
Experiment 2, explicitly grouping problems encouraged holistic processing, and led to 
increased investment relative to when problems were presented individually.   
 Together, these results suggest that perhaps the mechanism behind the bracketing effect 
differs based on task. In Experiment 2, because investments were identical, perhaps 
presentation of outcomes mattered less because the outcome frame provided redundant 
information. However, when the task was more analogous to a real-world investment 
circumstance, and investment choices were similar but not identical, presentation of outcomes 
was critical to risk-tolerant decision-making. Aggregated information in feedback helped to 
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reinforce both the similarities of choices and the benefits to taking the risky option. Future 
work in this discipline should thus focus on examination of continuous investments that are 
highly similar, but non-identical, making them more analogous to real-world investments.  
Finally, in both experiments it was hypothesized that either cognitive ability or 
processing style might mediate susceptibility to the bracketing manipulation. Intuitive 
participants might be more inclined to make context-dependent decisions, as they are less 
inclined to reflect on information presented to them. Conversely, more deliberative or 
reflective individuals might overcome contextual biases, as they tend to actively reframe 
information, regardless of its presentation format.  
No evidence for these hypotheses was found. In Experiment 1, only one demonstration 
of differential responses across framing based on cognitive reflection abilities was found, 
suggesting that perhaps participants who are more deliberative in nature might be better 
equipped to selectively attend to important information such as aggregates, or summary 
information. Individuals with lower cognitive reflection abilities, on the other hand, might 
attend equally to all information presented, and so are less inclined to behave in a more risk-
tolerant fashion when an aggregate is presented. That is, perhaps individuals with lower 
cognitive reflection abilities do not overweight the importance of outcome aggregates when 
considering the risk of decisions. However, when the task itself as adjusted to be more 
sensitive to changes in risk preference, no differences were found between individuals based 
on processing style or cognitive ability.  
Similarly, in Experiment 2, no differential susceptibilities to bracketing effects were 
seen. It was hypothesized that by using a continuous investment task, perhaps any marginal 
differences found in Experiment 1 might be amplified; instead, however, any differences were 
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minimized or eliminated. Together, results suggest that cognitive reflection ability plays little 
or no role in moderating susceptibility to bracketing effects in specific, and perhaps to framing 
effects in general.  
 
What can be said about the bracketing effect? 
 These findings suggest that there are circumstances under which the bracketing effect is 
brought about through problem framing (as in Experiment 2; Gneezy & Potters, 1997), and 
there are circumstances under which the bracketing effect is brought about through outcome 
framing (as in Experiment 1). But how can this information be applied to a broader 
understanding of investment behavior? 
 Previous research on the bracketing effect has suggested that problem framing 
encourages risk tolerance by encouraging participants to make more holistic decisions, thus 
behaving in a manner that encourages long-term forecasting (Thaler et al, 1997). Our results 
instead suggest that risk tolerance is encouraged when information is easy to process: in 
Experiment 1, risk tolerance was maximized when problems were presented individually, and 
when outcomes were presented in aggregate. Recall that the problems used in Experiment 1 
were all slightly different from one another, and thus might have required more capacity to be 
processed in groups. Thus, participants presented with a broadly bracketed set of choices were 
required to make several similar, but ultimately different, computations of risk, which may 
have encouraged them to focus on the number of risks (which was greater in the broad frame 
on a per-trial basis), as opposed to the magnitude of risk (which remained constant over trials). 
This risk tolerance or aversion set by the problem frame then interacts with presentation of 
outcomes. When outcomes are presented individually, participants are exposed to one win and 
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two losses for every three trials. Again, as in the problem frame, because amount of money 
won or lost on each trial is slightly different, participants are again biased to focus on the win-
to-lose ratio, instead of the amount won or lost over several trials (the objectively more 
important information). However, when an aggregate is incorporated into feedback or 
outcomes, participants are instead biased to attend to the magnitude of gains or losses, instead 
of the win-to-lose ratio. For gains, an aggregate outcome frame encourages risk tolerance by 
presenting a large sum that represents benefits of taking the riskier option (or of making larger 
investments in the gamble). That is, participants might learn, over trials, that as they begin to 
take riskier actions, overall their net earnings increase. Alternatively, in loss domains, this 
summary becomes a larger negative number, representing greater losses, as risky action 
increases. However, participants tend to respond to losses by taking more risky choices: as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note, “a person who has not made peace with his losses is 
likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise”. That is, when a 
participant has just felt the sting of a loss, he or she is more likely to bet on a long shot, instead 
of taking the objectively safer option, even if that option possesses higher expected value, as 
was the case in the experiments presented previously. By presenting losses in aggregate, then, 
participants were biased to make riskier decisions on subsequent trials, just as they were in 
gain domains.  
In contrast, this pattern was not observed in Experiment 2, where problems presented 
were identical in form. Here, participants appear to recognize that while the number of risks 
presented is greater in a broad problem frame, the magnitude of those risks has not changed; as 
a result, in a broad problem frame, risk tolerance is increased, as has been the case in previous 
demonstrations of the bracketing effect (see Gneezy & Potters, 1997). Further, outcome 
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framing appears to have no effect on risk tolerance, suggesting that outcomes hold weight in 
manipulating risk tolerance only when they convey new information. That is, when participants 
have already attended to the identical probability distribution of investments, the problem 
frame has successfully encouraged risk-tolerant decision making. As a result, the outcome 
bracketing effects observed in Experiment 1 do not exist when the task is changed in 
Experiment 2: the information they provide (that is, the summation of outcomes and 
aggregation of problems) has already been conveyed to participants through the problem 
frame. 
 
The importance of bracketing to investment 
 Bracketing of problems has often been used as an argument for aggregating investment 
choices, as it has generally led to more risk tolerance in the short run and increased net wealth 
in the long run (Thaler et al, 1997; Gneezy & Potters, 1997). Results of the two experiments 
presented suggest that a critical divide exists in this assumption. Indeed, Thaler et al (1997) 
and Gneezy and Potters (1997) are accurate in suggesting that when choices are identical, 
broadly bracketing their presentation is helpful in increasing risk-tolerant financial decision 
making. For example, when presenting investors with long-term investments that do not 
change over time, individuals are more likely to invest more when presented with only one 
decision. Indeed, it would seem redundant to present individuals with the opportunity to invest 
in a company by presenting individual risks for each share—it is implied that each share has 
identical risk and expected value. Instead, investors are presented with one risk statement, and 
choose to purchase as many shares as they choose (analogous to methodology of Experiment 
2). Additionally, when feedback on investments is given, the format may have little effect on 
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perceived risk, as this information has already been clearly represented in the minds of 
investors. 
 However, when the investment options themselves differ in risk, these assumptions fall 
short. For example, when investors are deciding which funds to invest in, they are often 
presented with several different options at once. Each option contains its own variety of risks, 
and these risks may aggregate in the minds of investors in a way similar to that of participants 
in Experiment 1: investors may attend to the number of risks presented, and not to the (more 
important) magnitude of risks. In turn, a broad bracket might have detrimental effects on risk 
tolerance, as investors have not attended to the most important information (magnitude of risk), 
and instead choose the funds containing fewer numbers of risks. Further, these individuals 
might be more sensitive to outcome presentation, as it may carry a larger weight in conveying 
to these individuals the actual risk of the investments they have chosen to participate in.  
 In sum, it appears as though the problem bracketing effect carries weight when 
investment decisions are identical; however, when investment decisions are even slightly 
different, an alternative view should be taken, where outcomes are aggregated so as to help 
individuals to refocus investments with a long-term perspective. Indeed, future research should 
focus on situations in which problem framing carries weight, situations in which outcome 
framing carries weight, and how this information can help individuals make more productive 
and prosperous investment decisions. In pursuit of gaining further understanding of problem 
and outcome bracketing effects, ongoing research has thus been focused on resolving task-
based issues in the current work. Specifically, we are currently testing problem and outcome 
bracketing hypotheses using a task that combines methodologies of both experiments presented 
above. That is, individual investments will still be similar, as in Experiment 1, but participants 
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will not make an all-or-none, discrete choice of whether to invest or not. Instead, participants 
will be able to invest up to 100 cents in each investment option, as in Experiment 2. 
Additionally, participants will be able to invest different amounts in each investment, unlike in 
Experiment 2. For example, in a broad problem frame, three similar investments will be 
presented at once, but participants will not have to invest identical amounts in each. Thus, in 
many ways this new design modifies Experiment 2 such that the task becomes more analogous 
to real-world investment scenarios that previous research has aimed to test. 
 Finally, at a more general level, ongoing research has been focused on understanding 
the mechanisms behind both problem and outcome framing. Are bracketing effects a result of 
unique presentation of risk information? If this is the case, individuals might benefit from any 
reframing of information that encourages them to focus on the most important information—
that which denotes risk and associated payoffs. Ultimately, gaining insight into how 
information presentation can influence risk tolerance is an important element in promoting 










Risky Option 1 
(1/3) 
Risky Option 2 
(2/3) 
50 165 -7.5 
50 160 -5 
50 170 -5 
50 160 -2.5 
50 165 -2.5 
50 170 -2.5 
50 160 0 
50 165 0 
50 170 0 
50 175 0 
55 180 -7.5 
55 185 -7.5 
55 175 -5 
55 180 -5 
55 185 -5 
55 170 -2.5 
55 175 -2.5 
55 180 -2.5 
55 185 -2.5 
55 190 -2.5 
55 170 0 
55 175 0 
55 180 0 
55 185 0 
55 190 0 
60 200 -10 
60 205 -10 
60 195 -7.5 
60 200 -7.5 
60 205 -7.5 
60 190 -5 
60 195 -5 




60 190 -2.5 
60 195 -2.5 
60 200 -2.5 
60 210 -2.5 
60 190 0 
60 195 0 
60 200 0 
60 205 0 
65 215 -10 
65 220 -10 
65 210 -7.5 
65 215 -7.5 
65 220 -7.5 
65 225 -7.5 
65 205 -5 
65 210 -5 
65 215 -5 
65 220 -5 
65 225 -5 
65 200 -2.5 
65 210 -2.5 
65 215 -2.5 
65 220 -2.5 
65 225 -2.5 
65 200 0 
65 205 0 
70 230 -10 
70 235 -10 
70 225 -7.5 
70 230 -7.5 
70 235 -7.5 
70 220 -5 
70 225 -5 
70 230 -5 
70 235 -5 
70 220 -2.5 
70 225 -2.5 
70 230 -2.5 
70 235 -2.5 
70 240 -2.5 
75 235 -5 
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Certain Option 
Risky Option 1 
(1/3) 
Risky Option 2 
(2/3) 
-75 -235 2.5 
-75 -235 5 
-70 -240 2.5 
-70 -235 2.5 
-70 -235 5 
-70 -235 7.5 
-70 -235 10 
-70 -230 2.5 
-70 -230 5 
-70 -230 7.5 
-70 -230 10 
-70 -225 2.5 
-70 -225 5 
-70 -225 7.5 
-70 -220 2.5 
-70 -220 5 
-65 -225 2.5 
-65 -225 5 
-65 -225 7.5 
-65 -220 2.5 
-65 -220 5 
-65 -220 7.5 
-65 -220 10 
-65 -215 2.5 
-65 -215 5 
-65 -215 7.5 
-65 -215 10 
-65 -210 2.5 
-65 -210 5 
-65 -210 7.5 
-65 -205 0 
-65 -205 5 
-65 -200 0 
-65 -200 2.5 
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-60 -210 2.5 
-60 -205 0 
-60 -205 5 
-60 -205 7.5 
-60 -205 10 
-60 -200 0 
-60 -200 2.5 
-60 -200 7.5 
-60 -200 10 
-60 -195 0 
-60 -195 2.5 
-60 -195 5 
-60 -195 7.5 
-60 -190 0 
-60 -190 2.5 
-60 -190 5 
-55 -190 0 
-55 -190 2.5 
-55 -185 0 
-55 -185 2.5 
-55 -185 5 
-55 -185 7.5 
-55 -180 0 
-55 -180 2.5 
-55 -180 5 
-55 -180 7.5 
-55 -175 0 
-55 -175 2.5 
-55 -175 5 
-55 -170 0 
-55 -170 2.5 
-50 -175 0 
-50 -170 0 
-50 -170 2.5 
-50 -170 5 
-50 -165 0 
-50 -165 2.5 
-50 -165 7.5 
-50 -160 0 
-50 -160 2.5 
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